^ [1951] AC 850 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). In Bolton, Lord Reid famously proclaimed that “[i]f cricket cannot be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk, then it should not be played there at all.” Id. at 867. Insofar as the case categorically condemns any imposition of a substantial risk as negligent, it is both normatively implausible and out of step with the rest of negligence doctrine. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence Law, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 489, 563–66 (2002). Even as an interpretation of Bolton, moreover, Ripstein and Weinrib’s position is unconvincing. It is much less plausible to understand Lord Reid as claiming that injuring a plaintiff by imposing any substantial risk upon her will constitute the tort of negligence than as claiming that doing so by playing cricket will constitute negligence, in light of the relatively trifling reasons that typically support playing cricket. Thus, it is unsurprising to see Lord Reid articulate a much different, and far more orthodox, conception of negligence in Morris v. W. Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co., [1956] AC 552 (HL) 574 (appeal taken from Eng.), which states that the negligence defendant must “weigh, on the one hand, the magnitude of the risk, the likelihood of an accident happening and the possible seriousness of the consequences if an accident does happen, and, on the other hand, the difficulty and expense and any other disadvantage of taking the precaution.”. See Gilles, supra, at 497–98. Pragmatic constructivists, to their considerable credit, do not attempt to bowdlerize such aspects of the law. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1999, 2033–41 (2007).
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